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THE FAITH AND MORALS OF 

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 

DAVID F. FORTE* 
Both admirers and cntlcs call Antonin Scalia the most 
influential Supreme Court justice in the last half century. 1 He made 
originalism2 a legitimate tool of analysis for previously recalcitrant 
justices.3 Today, originalism is the stuff of the advocate's brief. 4 
Antonin Scalia schooled his colleagues in the art of textual analysis, 5 
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law; B.A., Harvard College; M.A., University of Manchester; J.D., Columbia 
University; Ph.D., University ofToronto. I am grateful for the advice ofDr. Michael 
Uhlmann and for the assistance ofthe staff ofthe Cleveland-Marshall School of Law 
Library. The conclusions are the author's. 
1 Jeffry Rosen, What Made Antonin Scalia Great, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 12, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/20 l 6/02/what-made-antonin­
scalia-great/ 462837; George Weigel, After Justice Scalia, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 24, 
2016), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/02/after-justice-scalia. 
2 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 854 
(1989) ("Central to that analysis [John Marshall's defense of judicial review in 
Marbury v. Madison], it seems to me, is the perception that the Constitution, though 
it has an effect superior to other laws, is in its nature the sort of 'law' that is the 
business of the courts-an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through 
the usual devices familiar to those learned in the law") [hereinafter Originalism]. In 
other words, all that originalism requires is a standard method of statutory 
interpretation (as opposed to common-law interpretation) that lawyers in the Anglo­
American tradition have long been expert in. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). 
3 See, e.g., Justice John Paul Stevens' opinions in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
636 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Hugo Black has been termed a "liberal 
originalist," though it would seem more accurate to call him a "liberal textualist." 
Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism for Liberals, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 28, 1998), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/64084/originalism-liberals (reviewing Akil Reed 
Amar, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), and Akhil Reed Amar & Alan Hirsch, FOR THE 
PEOPLE (1998)). 
4 Adam Winkler, Originalism: It's not just for conservatives anymore, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/originalism-its­
not-just-for-conservatives-anymore/. 
5 See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and His 
Textualist Ideal, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 (2017). 
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and today, justices gloss a text as never before.6 "Justice Scalia's 
powerful arguments for originalism and textualism changed the way 
all justices, liberal and conservative, approached cases," declared 
Professor Aziz Huq of the University of Chicago Law School. 7 And 
he over and again called his colleagues to task for exceeding their 
mandate. What lay behind the singular influence of this man-an 
influence made more by his dissents than his majority opinions? 
Not since Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. has a justice's 
contrariness figured so much in the development of constitutional law. 
Both Holmes and Scalia thought that judges ought to get out of the 
way of the other branches of government-Holmes because his 
skepticism led him to think judges were not capable of making 
decisions on great social issues, 8 Scalia because he thought the 
Constitution did not give him the right to make such decisions in the 
first place. 9 
How did it come to be that the skeptic and the religious 
adherent were so close? Both men were intellectuals, experts in 
common law reasoning, 10 scions of their families, sons of respected 
men of letters. Both were prodded to success by demanding 
accomplished fathers. 11 Both found their voice in ringing dissents. 
6 See, e.g., Justice Elena Kagan's opinion in Advocate Health Care Network v. 
Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017), and Justice Neil Gorsuch's opinion in Henson v. 
Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017). The contending opinions 
ofJustices Sotomayor and Kagan in case ofLockhart v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 938 
(2016), fought over the application of the "rule of the last antecedent" to a three 
word phrase in a federal criminal statute. 
7 Jeremy Manier, Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court justice andformer UChicago 
law professor, 1936-2016, UCHICAGO NEWS, https://news.uchicago.edu/ 
storyIantonin-scalia -supreme-court-justice-and-former-uchicago-law-professor­
l 936-2016. 
8 David F. Forte, The Making of the Modern Supreme Court: Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., andLouis D. Brandeis, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
602, 607 (Bryan-Paul Frost & Jeffrey Sikkenga eds., 2d ed. 2019). 
9 ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH AND LIFE 
WELL LIVED 169-75 (Christopher Scalia, & Edward Whelan eds., 2017). 
10 See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881); 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
11 Holmes' father, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., was a celebrated essayist. G. 
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Both crafted quotable aphorisms. Both had circles of close friends. 
Both excited adulation. Both incurred enmity. 
Yet Holmes was a relativist, while Scalia thought that reason 
could reach the truth. Holmes believed that religion was so much 
superstition. Scalia believed that religion pointed to a transcendent 
reality. Holmes was diffident. Scalia impertinent. Holmes was a 
Boston Brahmin from Beacon Hill. Scalia was an Italian kid who 
grew up in Queens. 
But they shared much. For one thing, Holmes and Scalia took 
a puckish delight in upholding laws they never would have otherwise 
supported. Holmes once wrote: "It has given me great pleasure to 
sustain the Constitutionality of laws that I believe to be as bad as 
possible."12 Scalia famously declared: "If it were up to me, I would 
put in jail every sandal-wearing, scruffy-bearded weirdo who bums 
the American flag. But I am not king."13 Yet Scalia was certain that 
the First Amendment protects the kind ofcontempt for the government 
and its symbols that flag burning represents. 14 
We can easily understand how the free-thinking Holmes would 
be suspicious of judges who strayed off into popular social and 
economic theory. He was equally disdainful of progressives and 
laissez faire apologists. 15 But what of Scalia? How could a man who 
had utter confidence in the reality of absolute truth find himself on the 
same ground as the skeptical Holmes? 
The puzzle is deepened when we see that Scalia actually shared 
Holmes' historicist view of the common law. In 1881, when Holmes 
published his seminal work, The Common Law, he penned a phrase in 
EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 9­
14 (1993). Scalia's father was a respected Professor of Romance Languages. JOAN 
BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 13-17 (2009). 
12 LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 67 (2001 ). 
13 Antonin Scalia Explains Why Americans Can Burn the Flag, HEAVY.COM 
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://heavy.com/news/2016/11/watch-antonin-scalia-flag­
burning-donald-trump-video-justice-say-about-first-amendment-freedom-of-speec 
h. 
14 ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 207. 
15 G. EDWARD WHITE, supra note 10, at 320. 
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its opening paragraph that has likely been the most oft-quoted 
aphorism in American legal language: "The life of the law has not 
been logic: it has been experience." He furthered developed his thesis: 
The felt necessities ofthe time, the prevalent moral and 
political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed 
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do 
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which 
men should be govemed. 16 
One might think that Holmes' view that the law must adapt to "the felt 
necessities of the time" was precisely what was anathema to Scalia, 
more especially because Holmes has often been credited with being 
the progenitor of the School of Legal Realism, a view of the law that 
Scalia could not abide by. 17 
Nonetheless, in truth, Scalia accepted the Holmesian view of 
the common law-that it was, in fact, law created by judges. Scalia 
declared, "The common law is judge-made law, crafted and refined by 
judges over time to fit the needs of a changing and developing 
society."18 Scalia could have embraced a pre-Holmesian notion of 
the common law, for until Holmes, even though they repaired to 
experience, judges nonetheless still saw law as a "given," and they 
believed that they were interpreting it within a larger framework. That 
overarching framework was, as has been famously noted, part of a 
"higher law" tradition, including, to some degree, an appreciation of 
the natural law within. 19 But both Holmes and Scalia derided the 
natural law. In 1915, Holmes wrote an essay that constituted a frontal 
attack on the tradition from the avowed perspective of skepticism. For 
Holmes, one's preferences were the only touchstone of reality. 
Natural lawyers, he argued, were "in that nai've state of mind that 
16 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881 ). 
17 At Harvard Law School, Scalia was exposed to a movement that disdained 
Legal Realism in favor of "legal process" and neutral principles oflaw." RICHARD 
A BRISBAIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 14­
15 (1997). 
18 ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 174 (emphasis in original). 
19 See generally EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW "BACKGROUND OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1971). 
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accepts which has been familiar and accepted by them and their 
neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men 
everywhere."20 
But here also, Scalia was at one with Holmes. He too 
disdained the natural law. Although Hadley Arkes has detected 
natural law underpinnings in Scalia's reasoning,21 Scalia himself 
claimed to have no truck with the system of natural law, at least as a 
grounding for making judicial decisions. No matter how objective 
natural law might be, Scalia, like Justice Hugo Black before him, 
thought that in the hands of judges, "natural law" would be but an 
excuse for interposing one's subjective policy preferences into the 
law. As Black put it in Adamson v. California: 22 "This decision 
reasserts a constitutional theory ... that this Court is endowed by the 
Constitution with boundless power under 'natural law' periodically to 
expand and contract constitutional standards to conform to the Court's 
conception of what at a particular time constitutes 'civilized decency' 
and 'fundamental liberty and justice. "'23 Similarly, Justice Scalia 
wrote: "Do you really want judges-fallible judges-going about 
enforcing their vision of natural law, contrary to the dictates of 
democratically enacted positive law? Lord, no."24 For Scalia, a 
discretionary approach to judging, whether it be the natural law or the 
common law, was inappropriate for an appellate court, at least for a 
court at the highest constitutional level. For Scalia, the nature of 
20 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE 
HOLMES 446 (Sheldon Novick ed. 1995). 
21 Hadley Arkes, The SelfMade Trap, CLAREMONT.0RG (Fed. 23, 2016), 
https ://www.claremont.org/ crb/article/the-self-made-trap ("Was Scalia revealing, 
yet again, that he had been "speaking prose" all his life-that he had been offering 
us handsome examples of natural law reasoning for many years, while insisting to 
us that it couldn't be done?"); Hadley Arkes, Antonin Scalia: A Spirited Life in the 
Law, NATIONAL REVIEW (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.nationalreview. 
com/2016/02/antonin-scalias-jurisprudence ("Scalia was a relentless logician, and 
as he sought the logic behind the text he would persistently find himself reasoning 
back to those principles that were not in the text"). 
22 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
23 Id. at 69 (Black, J. dissenting) (citations omitted). 
24 ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 248. 
72 INTER CULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14 
law-at least, statutory law and constitutional law-was positivistic.25 
Its validity derived from the will of the democratic electorate. 
As Justice Scalia would not have the judge be a philosopher of 
natural law, still less would he want a judge to be a historian of natural 
law. History (and he attacked the use of legislative history in 
particular )26 was as capable of being manipulated to affirm a judge's 
prejudices as was philosophy. 27 Even when Scalia was forced to have 
recourse to history, in order to discern a constitutional principle, he 
did so on the most narrow possible grounds. In Michael H. v. Gerald 
D.,28 the Supreme Court had to decide whether to uphold California's 
presumption that the husband (Gerald D.) of a married woman who 
had given birth was the father of the child against the claim of the 
woman's lover (Michael H.) that he was a biological father. The lover 
claimed a due process liberty interest in visitation rights to the child. 
Following precedent that required that a liberty interest be one that is 
"traditionally protected by our society,"29 Scalia found for the 
husband. He determined that there was no such historical liberty 
interest in the lover's claim, but that, on the contrary, the presumption 
of the husband's paternity is part of "[t]he historic respect -- indeed, 
sanctity would not be too strong a term -- traditionally accorded to the 
relationships that develop within the unitary family."30 In a 
controversial footnote, Scalia argued that when the Court must resort 
to history to inform its decision, it must consult "the most specific 
tradition available." "[G]eneral traditions," on the other hand, he 
wrote, "provide such imprecise guidance, [that] they permit judges to 
dictate rather than discern the society's views."31 
25 See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1175 (1989). See also Beau J. Brock, Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A 
Renaissance ofPositivism and Predictability in Constitutional Adjudication, 51 LA. 
L. REV. 623 (1991). George Kannar terms Scalia's approach a "profoundly 
positivist and textualist vision." George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of 
Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L. J. 1297, 1307 (1990). 
26 ANTONIN SCALIA SPEAKS, supra note 9, at 236-42. 

27 Originalism, supra note 2, at 864. 

28 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 

29 Id. at 122. 

30 Id. at 123. 

31 Id. at 127 (n. 6). Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Brennan took issue with 
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It is because of Justice Scalia's suspicion ofphilosophy and of 
history that he becomes an outspoken textualist. 32 But why should 
text carry greater authority? Why should the written word, rather than 
evolving tradition, be of higher authority, particularly to a Roman 
Catholic? To understand Antonin Scalia's affirmation of the 
centrality of text, we must, as many already have, seek to find out how 
the man viewed his religion and how he practiced it. 
II 
Antonin Scalia was neither the first, nor the last, Catholic 
appointed to the Supreme Court, but he was the most outspoken about 
his faith off the bench. Many observers have, in fact, remarked on 
the man's Catholicism, but often with inaccurate reductionism. For 
example, in his critical biography, Bruce Alan Murphy repeatedly 
declares that Scalia was part of "the new Catholic majority" that was 
able to exert its influence on constitutional law beginning in 2007, 
because of the shared religious beliefs of the five of its members. 33 
When Professor Geoffrey Stone of the University of Chicago Law 
School (and former faculty colleague ofScalia's) made the same claim 
that it had been the religion of the Catholic majority that had decided 
the partial birth abortion case,34 Scalia was so outraged at Stone that 
Scalia's narrow methodology. 
32 Even though Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Black's distrust of natural 
law reasoning, Scalia believed that Black was an inadequate textualist. Black had 
thought that the First Amendment's phrasing that began "Congress shall pass no 
law" was an absolute prohibition on any legislation that restricted freedom of speech. 
But Scalia emphasized that the First Amendment does not say that government shall 
not abridge freedom of speech. It says that government shall not abridge 'THE 
freedom of speech'-that is, that freedom of speech which was the understood right 
of Englishmen." ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 203-04 (emphasis in original). 
And Black, Scalia declared, never did any work to find out what the historic meaning 
of the phrase actually was. Id. at 205. 
33 BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 361-63 (2015). 
34 Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Geoffrey R. Stone, Stone on 
Faith Based Justices, LAW.UCHICAGO.EDU (April 30, 2007), 
https ://www .law. uchicago. edu/news/stone-faith-based-justices. 
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he exclaimed, "Now, he knows that's a damn lie."35 Scalia pledged, 
"I will not appear at the University of Chicago until he is no longer on 
the faculty."36 Later, Scalia and Stone reconciled, and in 2012, Scalia 
gave a well-received lecture at the University ofChicago Law School. 
Shortly before he died, Scalia wrote Stone a note thanking him, when 
Stone had publicly defended Scalia on another controversial matter. 37 
Murphy's and Stone's view-and they are not the only 
ones38-comes from equating Catholicism with a political ideology. 
It is a perspective, once Protestant39 and now secular,40 that has 
distorted American views of Catholicism for over two centuries.41 
Scalia always took the deepest personal umbrage at charges that he 
was a results-oriented judge, and a Catholic results-oriented judge to 
boot. He asserted that an "evolving constitutionalist" would utilize his 
personal views, including his religious views, to guide his 
interpretation. But a textualist (like Scalia) tries to keep himself 
immune from such temptations.42 
Many other observers have said that Scalia was a 
35 JOAN BISKUPIC, supra note 11, 204. 
36 Id. 
37 Stone stated: "Two months ago, after he made some controversial comments 
from the bench during oral argument in an affirmative action case, I wrote an op-ed 
defending his questioning. He very graciously emailed me to thank me. That was, 
sadly, my last personal contact with him." Geoffrey R. Stone, Tough, Brilliant, and 
Kind: The Antonin Scalia 1 Knew, DAILY BEAST, February 14, 2016, 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/tough-brilliant-and-kind-the-antonin-scalia-i-knew. 
38 As an example, Senators Mazie Hirono and Kamala Harris have recently 
questioned the objectivity of a nominee to the federal bench because he is a member 
of the Knights of Columbus. Ed Condon, Judicial nominee faces Senate scrutiny 
over Knights ofColumbus membership, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/senators-quiz-nominee-about-member 
ship-of-extreme-knights-of-columbus-78683. 
39 See, e.g., LYMAN BEECHER, A PLEA FOR THE WEST (1835). 
40 See, e.g., PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 
(1949). 
41 Phillip Hamburger, A Dismal Tradition, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/0 l/a-dismal-tradition; Sanford 
Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics 
Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAULL. REV. 1047 (1990). 
42 JOAN BISKUPIC, supra note 11, at 209. 
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"conservative Catholic" or a pre-Vatican II Catholic, and that explains 
him.43 George Kannar, for example, attempts to solve the riddle of 
why a Catholic judge, rather than a Protestant judge, should be so 
beholden to the text. Kannar traces Scalia's "sola scriptura" attitude 
to being a pre-Vatican II Catholic, subject to the literalism of The 
Baltimore Catechism. 44 Although Kannar understands the religious 
culture in which Scalia was raised and which he embraced, others 
doubt that the pre-Vatican Catholic culture was what made him so 
insistent on text and originalism. Donald J. Beschle, for example, 
points out that Catholic justices, like Frank Murphy, were raised in the 
same milieu and were equally beholden to their faith, but had a far 
different interpretive mien. 45 
What Kannar and Beschle and others do understand, however, 
was the passionate devotion Antonin Scalia had for his faith. Antonin 
Scalia was a truly devout Catholic-not a cafeteria Catholic, not a 
Christmas and Easter Catholic, not even a once a week Sunday 
Catholic. And, for Scalia, to be a devout Catholic makes one neither 
a conservative nor a liberal. That is why he objected so vehemently 
to those who charged that he was importing either political or religious 
policy positions into his judging. And why he was embarrassed when 
opponents of abortion commended him on his stand: 
I must tell them that I deserve no thanks; that my 
position is not a virtuous affirmation of my religious 
belief, or even a sagacious policy choice, but simply 
the product of lawyerly analysis of constitutional text 
and tradition; and that if legal analysis had produced 
the opposite conclusion I would have come out the 
opposite way, regardless of their or my views 
43 Murphy is typical: "Indeed, for Scalia, there were strong similarities between 
the literal reading of biblical text and the use of historical sources to interpret 
Scripture in the pre-Vatican II Catholic faith, and the historically based dictionary 
technique for interpreting the Constitution in his originalist/textualist philosophy." 
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, supra note 33, at 366. 
44 Kannar, supra note 25, at 1313. 
45 See generally Donald J. Beschle, Catechism or Imagination: Is Justice 
Scalia 's Judicial Style Typically Catholic?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1329 (1992). 
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concerning abortion. 46 
III 
So let us enquire what part or parts of Scalia's Catholicism 
might have accounted for his particular style of judging and why he 
believed that originalism and textualism were morally required of 
judges. We can say that the fundamental elements that constitute 
Catholicism are beliefs (doctrines and dogmas), devotions (including 
prayers and the sacraments), moral imperatives (which include good 
works and vocation), and Church (hierarchical authority). The last, 
the hierarchical authority of the Church, defines beliefs, administers 
devotions, and teaches morality. That function ofthe Church is termed 
its Magisterium, or teaching office. 47 The Catholic Catechism 
describes the Magisterium as, 
The task of giving an authentic interpretation of the 
Word ofGod, whether in its written form or in the form 
of Tradition, has been entrusted to the living office of 
the Church alone. Its authority in this matter is 
exercised in the name of Jesus Christ. This means that 
the task of interpretation has been entrusted to the 
bishops in communion with the successor of Peter, the 
Bishop ofRome.48 
It is the glue that holds this temporal institution, its mission, 
and its adherents together. 
For a devout Catholic, to live one's religion means: (1) fidelity 
to the Magisterium; (2) worship and prayer; (3) constant introspection, 
meditation, and self-evaluation; ( 4) moral living and the practice of 
charity; and (5) a commitment to a unique vocation. Ifwe can see how 
Antonin Scalia approached each of those elements ofhis faith, we may 
46 ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 152. 
47 See generally AVERY DULLES, MAGISTERIUM: TEACHER AND GUARDIAN OF 
THE FAITH (2010). 
48 Catechism of the Catholic Church, Pt. I. Sec. 1, ch. 2, art. 3, par. 85, 
VATICAN.VA, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/ _PM.HTM#84 (last visited 
March 29, 2019) [hereinafter Cathechism]. 
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be able to discern why he was such a passionate apologist for 
originalist textualism. 
In his early childhood years, Antonin Scalia's parents enrolled 
him in public school in Queens. But at Xavier High School in lower 
Manhattan, he received a thorough Jesuit Catholic education. He 
excelled and graduated as valedictorian. All agree that the rigor of the 
place profoundly affected Scalia. His religious devotions were 
extensive; his Catholic identity prominent to those around him. 49 
He went on to Georgetown University, which was not then the 
secular clone it was later criticized as becoming. In the 1950s, 
Georgetown was a conservative Jesuit Catholic institution. Here too, 
Scalia's Catholic faith remained strong. Here too, he triumphed 
scholastically and became valedictorian. He majored in history, 
though he was later to become suspicious of historical research as a 
guide to determining what a legal rule should be. He had become 
very self-confident, but at his oral comprehensive exams, he was given 
a dose of humility. After answering a number of questions with skill 
and competence, he later recalled, the examiner said, "'Very good, Mr. 
Scalia. I have one last question: If you look back over all the history 
that you've studied here over the last four years, ifyou had to pick one 
event that you thought was the most significant, what would it be?"' 
Scalia could not recall what he answered in response, but he did 
remember his questioner's reaction. "[H]e shook his head sadly and 
said, 'No, Mr. Scalia. The Incarnation, Mr. Scalia."' The lesson that 
Scalia said he learned from this encounter: "[N]ot to separate your 
religious life from your intellectual life."50 
One would think that the product of such an education would 
have a particular loyalty to the Magisterium and to authorities that the 
Church holds up as exemplary. During his time on the Supreme 
Court, Scalia spoke frequently before university chapters of the St. 
Thomas More Society (he had been a member while at Georgetown), 
and at these talks, he repeatedly affirmed a strong confession of faith. 
He took the lesson given him at his comprehensive finals to preach a 
humble acceptance of faith, even though fidelity to the tenets of 
49 JOAN BISKUPIC, supra note 11, at 21-22. 

50 Id. at 25. 
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Christianity inevitably makes one an outcast, a simpleton, in the eyes 
of the secular elites. 
To believe, first and foremost, that Jesus Christ was God. 
(Why the notion that the Creator should become a bull is as 
unsophisticated as the notion that Zeus should become a bull.) Or to 
believe that he was born of a virgin. (Well, I mean, Really!) That he 
actually, physically, rose from the grave. That he founded a church 
with the power to bind and loose-to pronounce, authoritatively, the 
will of God for mankind. That, as he taught, hardship and suffering 
are not to be avoided at all costs but are to be embraced and indeed 
even sought after-as penance for sin, and as a means of sharing in 
the crucifixion of Christ. (How utterly ridiculous to forego legitimate 
pleasures and to seek discomfort! How absurd the vow and chastity 
and the hair shirt!) Or the belief in miracles as at Lourdes and Fatima. 
Or, finally, the belief that those who love God and obey his commands 
will rise from the dead, in their bodies, and be happy with him forever 
in heaven; and that those who do not will burn in hell. 51 
True to his prediction, his witness was widely castigated by 
critics,52 but that did not dissuade him from repeating his attachment 
to his beliefs before other audiences. 53 One friend said of him, "I 
think his faithful belief in Catholic doctrine is what makes him run. I 
think he is a true believer."54 
His outspokenness was a product of his personality, his 
intelligence, and his upbringing. But it was also clearly a product of 
his faith. While at Georgetown University, he spent his junior abroad 
in Switzerland. He reported, "On the way back home, I spent some 
time in England, and I remember going to Hyde Park Corner. And 
there was a Roman Catholic priest in his collar, standing on a soapbox, 
preaching the Catholic faith and being heckled by a group. And I 
thought, My goodness. I thought that was admirable. I have often 
bemoaned the fact that the Catholic Church has sort of lost that 
51 ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 108. 
Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia 's Sermonette, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863, 864-65 (1997). 
53 See, for example, his talk before The Judicial Prayer Breakfast Group. 
ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 117. 
54 JOAN BISKUPIC, supra note 11, at 187. 
52 
79 2019] FAITH AND MORALS OF ANTONIN SCALIA 
evangelistic spirit."55 In that sense he was at one with the call for a 
"new evangelization"56 of the recent popes despite his public 
disagreement with them on the issue of capital punishment. 
One should have expected that Scalia's witness to the tenets of 
Christian Catholicism would also make him a follower of other 
authoritative sources of the Church's teachings, such as papal 
pronouncements or figures such as St. Thomas Aquinas. But Scalia's 
affirmation of the Church's Magisterium did not mean that he always 
accepted the hierarchy's interpretation of the corpus of the 
Magisterium, even when that hierarchy included the Pope. The rigor 
of his education had actually equipped him to contest authoritative 
figures in the Church. In some ways, Antonin Scalia was more 
Catholic than the Pope-literally. He famously contested Pope St. 
John Paul II's stand on capital punishment. In his encyclical, 
Evangelium Vitae, the Pope had stated in regard to the death penalty, 
It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the 
nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully 
evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the 
extreme of executing the offender except in cases of 
absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not 
be possible otherwise to defend society. Today 
however, as a result of steady improvements in the 
organization of the penal system, such cases are very 
rare, if not practically non-existent. 57 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church, published in 1992, had 
evinced a similarly limited accepted of the death penalty. 
Assuming that the guilty party's identity and responsibility 
have been fully determined, the traditional teaching of the Church 
does not exclude recourse to the death penalty, if this is the only 
possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust 
55 Maureen Fiedler, Justice Antonin Scalia: a very traditional Catholic, 
NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.ncronline.org/ 
blogs/ncr-today /justice-antonin-scalia -very-traditional-catho lie. 
56 What is the New Evangelization?, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF 
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/how-we­
teach/new-evangelization/index.cfm (last visited March 29, 2019). 
57 Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Evangelium Vitae if 56 (Mar. 25, 1995). 
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58aggressor. 
But Antonin Scalia was not persuaded. In fact, he thought that 
the Pope was flat out wrong, and even quoted St. Paul against him. 59 
Restating what has been the traditional Catholic position on the 
authority of the Pope, Scalia declared: 
I am therefore happy to learn from the canonical 
experts I have consulted that the position set forth in 
Evangelium Vitae and in the latest version of the 
Catholic catechism does not purport to be binding 
teaching-that is, it need not be accepted by practicing 
Catholics, though they must give it thoughtful and 
respectful consideration ... So I have given this new 
position thoughtful and careful consideration-and I 
disagree.60 
Scalia defended his position that capital punishment was "not 
immoral" because punishment as a just retribution for immoral actions 
is not only divinely sanctioned (Christ's atonement for sins against 
God is the "type" that authorizes the moral validity of retributive 
capital punishment by those in political authority) but retribution for 
moral harms is also the (natural?) understanding of people in 
general. 61 
Conservative churchmen of respected authority such as A very 
Dulles and Bishop Charles J. Chaput) defended the change in the 
Pope's teaching and retorted sharply to Scalia.62 Bishop Chaput went 
so far as to equate Scalia's dissention from the newly articulated 
teaching on capital punishment with Catholics who dissent from the 
Church's teaching on abortion.63 Subsequently Pope Francis has 
58 Catechism, supra note 48, at Pt. III, Sec. 2, ch. 2, art. 5, para. 2267. 
59 Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS (May 2002), 





62 Antonin Scalia and his Critics: The Church, the Courts, and the Death 

Penalty, FIRST THINGS (October 2002), https://www.firstthings.com/article 
12002110/antonin -scalia -and-his-critics-the-church-the-courts-and-the-death-penal 
ty. 
63 Id. 
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revised the Catechism even further to state that use ofthe death penalty 
is now "inadmissible."64 One might think that, were Justice Scalia still 
alive, he would continue his disagreement with the man who sits in 
the Chair of Peter. On the other hand, when Scalia was asked about 
Pope Francis's views (Francis became Pope eleven months before 
Scalia's death), Scalia answered, "He's the Vicar of Christ. He's the 
chief. I don't run down the pope."65 
Not only was Scalia unafraid to contest the successor to Saint 
Peter, but, as we shall see below, he had no hesitation to dispute St. 
Thomas Aquinas. Thus, to those who define Scalia simply as a pre­
Vatican II Catholic, he certainly did not fit the stereotype as an 
uncompromising follower ofpapal or even Thomistic authority. 
What of the other elements of the man's Catholicity? Antonin 
Scalia was certainly a worshipful and prayerful man. He frequently 
attended daily Mass, and often sat quietly afterwards doing his 
spiritual reading for the day. At his funeral Mass, his son, Father Paul 
Scalia, said ofhim, "He treasured the Church's ceremonies, especially 
the beauty of her ancient worship. He trusted the power of the 
Sacraments as the means of salvation-as Christ working within him 
for his salvation."66 
The "ancient worship" that Father Scalia was referring to was 
the Latin Mass. Antonin Scalia would travel far to be able to attend 
a Latin Mass, as was available at St. Matthew's Cathedral in 
Washington, or even the older Tridentine rite observed at parish 
churches. He had a number of face-to-face disputes with priests, 
whether it be a "smart-ass young Jesuit" or "some crazy Dominicans," 
who had either belittled Catholic doctrine from the pulpit, or 
64 Edward Pentin, Pope Francis Changes Catechism to Say Death Penalty 
'Inadmissible,' NATIONAL CATHOLIC REGISTER (Aug. 2, 2018), 
http ://www. ncre gister. com/blog/ edward-pentin/pope-francis-changes-catec hism ­
to-declare-death-penalty-inadmissible. 
65 Michael O'Loughlin, Scalia was a champion of traditional Catholicism, 
CRUX (Feb. 14, 2016), https://cruxnow.com/faith/2016/02/14/scalia-was-a­
champion-of-traditional-catholicism/. 
66 Paul Scalia, Funeral Homily for Justice Antonin Scalia, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 
2, 2016), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/02/funeral-homily-for­
justice-antonin-scalia. 
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bowdlerized the Mass from the altar. 67 In a speech to the Knights of 
Columbus, he praised "'traditional Catholics' who say the Rosary, go 
on pilgrimages, kneel during the Eucharist, and 'follow religiously the 
teachings of the Pope."'68 Commenting on Scalia's love of traditional 
architecture and worship in the Church, Leonard Leo concluded, 
"What those outward manifestations allow him to do is to focus on 
faith and to achieve a level of spirituality."69 That faith included 
frequent retreats ("Any person who believes in the transcendental has 
to go on a retreat periodically"),70 and when he could, Mass during the 
week. 
These faithful practices brought forth a man of charity, which 
conclusion might seem misapplied to one who had no hesitation in 
denigrating his colleagues' opinions, reporters' assumptions, and 
lukewarm priests' insults to the faith and liturgy. But his oft-cited 
friendship with Ruth Bader Ginsburg was no aberration. When called 
upon to battle Justice Ginsburg in the forum of the Court's 
adjudications, he did so. But there was a genuine love between the 
two. In that sense, Scalia followed Christ's command to "love your 
enemies,"71 that is, to see and know one's opponent as a person, even 
though she might necessarily have to be an enemy also. Ginsburg said 
of her friend, "[H]e attacked ideas, not people."72 
His charity extended to strangers. Shortly after his death, 
Jeffrey A. Tucker, a businessman in the Washington area, revealed the 
following vignette: 
It was a spring afternoon some years ago, and he was 
attending church services, sitting in a back pew, 
holding his prayer book in his hands. The Mass had 
ended and most people had gone. He was still saying 
prayers, alone in the back pew. 
He finally got up and began to walk out. There were no 
67 JOAN BISKUPIC, supra note 11, at 186-87. 

68 Id. at 188. 

69 Id. at 187. 

70 ANTONIN SCALIA SPEAKS, supra note 9, at 145. 

71 MATTHEW 5:44; LUKE 6:27 

72 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Foreword, in SCALIA SPEAKS, supra note 9, at x. 
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reporters, nobody watching. There was only a woman 

who had been attending the same services. She had no 

idea who he was. I was a bystander, and I'm certain he 

didn't know I was there. 

What was a bit unusual about this woman: she had 

lashing sores on her face and hands. They were open 

sores. There was some disease, and not just physically. 

She behaved strangely, a troubled person that you meet 

in large cities and quickly walk away from. A person 

to avoid and certainly never touch. 

For whatever reason, she walked up to Justice Scalia, 

who was alone. He took her hands, though they were 

full of sores. She leaned in to say something, and she 

began to cry. 

He held her face next to his, and she talked beneath her 

tears that were now streaming down his suit. He didn't 

flinch. He didn't try to get away. He just held her while 

she spoke. This lasted for perhaps more than 5 minutes. 

He closed his eyes while she spoke, gripping her back 

with his hand. 





There were no cameras and no other onlookers besides 

myself, and he had no idea I was there. 

Finally she was finished. What he said comforted her, 

and she gained composure. She pulled away, ready to 

go. He held her rough, sore-filled hands and had a few 





And then she walked away. 

And then he walked away, across the green grass, 

toward the Supreme Court building, alone. He was 

probably preparing for an afternoon of work.73 

73 Jeffrey A. Tucker, Justice Scalia 's Great Heart, FEE (Feb. 13, 2016), 
https ://fee. org/artic les/justice-scalia -s-great-heart/. 
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IV 
Where then do we find the intersection of Antonin Scalia's 
actions as a judge and as a loyal believer in the tenets of the Catholic 
faith? How do we reconcile his assertions that his faith never dictated 
to him a substantive outcome to a case with his personal rule "not to 
separate your religious life from your intellectual life?" 
It is, perhaps, in Scalia's understanding of the Catholic notion 
of vocation. Scalia often stated, "There is no such thing as a Catholic 
judge," just as there is no such thing as "a Catholic way to cook a 
hamburger."74 But even according to his own lights, Scalia would 
have to affirm that there must be a Catholic way of cooking a 
hamburger, and he sometimes did so. "No matter how good a Catholic 
a short-order chef may be, for example, there is no such things as a 
Catholic hamburger. Unless, of course, it is a perfectly made and 
perfectly cooked hamburger."75 Equally for Scalia, there was only a 
good judge and one who was not: a faithful judge, or one who was not. 
"Just as there is no Catholic way to cook a hamburger, so also is there 
no Catholic way to interpret a text, analyze a historical tradition, or 
discern the meaning and legitimacy of prior judicial decisions­
except, of course, to do those things honestly and peifectly."76 
To arrive at one's understanding of one's proper role requires 
serious self-evaluation. It is not just in the Sacrament of Confession 
that the Catholic must evaluate himself and own up to his frailties. It 
is in all the devotions of the Church: the rosary, pilgrimages, retreats, 
missions, scriptural study, days ofrecollection and in spiritual reading. 
All these things Scalia did. 
It is in these activities that a person develops what the Church 
calls an informed conscience, that is, a conscience that has been 
developed to meet ethical problems in a deeply principled way, and 
not just based on intuition and feeling. One of Scalia's favorite saints, 
74 Robert T. Miller, Antonin Scalia: Not at Catholic (Judge), FIRST THINGS 
(Oct. 23, 2007), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2007/1 O/antonin­
scalia-not-a-catholic. 
75 ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 149. 
76 Id. at 152 (emphasis in original). 
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St. Thomas More, exemplified for him such an informed conscience. 
Scalia recalled an earlier example ofwhat this practice of self-
examination requires: 
[In high school], one of my classmates-I remember 
his name, Antonelli-volunteered some criticism of 
Hamlet. Very sophomoric, of course. Fr. Matthews 
looked at him with a steely glaze, and said to him in his 
Boston accent, "Mister, when you read Shakespeare, 
Shakespeare's not on trial, you are." I have always 
thought that a very good principle useful in many areas 
of life, including the law. What Shakespeare is to high 
school students, a society's long-established traditions 
are to the jurist. He does not judge them; he is judged 
bythem.77 
Such internal exercises lead one to the practice of what the 
Church calls discernment, that is, deciding what is the unique role 
given to you by God in any particular stage in life, that is, what your 
vocation, or your calling is. Scalia, as many of us do, had a number 
of vocations: lawyer, teacher, government servant, husband (and then 
father), and judge. But each successive role did not just happen to 
him; he thoughtfully chose it. Discernment impels one to choose. 
Once, for example, in answer to a question, Scalia wryly 
homed in on the essence of the vocation of marriage. A woman once 
declared to him, "Justice Scalia, you must love children." "Why do 
you say that?" "Because you have so many of them." "That doesn't 
show that I love children. That shows that I love my wife."78 His 
Radcliffe-educated wife Maureen had a better response: "We are both 
overachievers."79 For Antonin Scalia and Maureen Scalia, the 
77 Antonin Scalia, On Realism and the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment, https://www.americamhetoric.com/speeches/antoninscaliarealismre 
ligionconstitution.htm (last visited March 29, 2019). 
78 BRUCE ALAN MURPHY, supra note 33. 
79 Ashley McGuire, Justice Antonin Scalia on Family Life, INSTITUTE FOR 
FAMILY STUDIES (Feb. 18, 2016), https://ifstudies.org/blog/justice-antonin-scalia­
on-family-life/. On another occasion, Justice Scalia quipped, "We didn't set out to 
have nine children. We're just old-fashioned Catholics, playing what used to be 
known as 'Vatican Roulette.'" JOAN BISKUPIC, supra note 11, at 187. 
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vocation of marriage was found in the husband's loving commitment 
to the wife and in the wife's loving commitment to the husband, and 
through that love does life and offspring arise, which lead to the further 
but derivative vocations of father and mother. 
A vocation requires limits. A vocation sets boundaries. It is in 
vocation that mutually respectful boundaries are set. The priest 
respects the married state. The husband and wife respect their bond. 
The artist respects the value of the physician, and the physician of the 
accountant. And the judge of the legislator. For Antonin Scalia, the 
judge who tries to become a legislator does not respect his own 
vocation. As he told one audience tongue in cheek, "I don't deal with 
policy-that's not my business. I gave it up when I took the veil."80 
It was in defense of his vocation a judge that Antonin Scalia 
crossed swords with St. Thomas Aquinas, in front of an audience of 
Dominicans, no less. 81 He reflected on Aquinas' views on the written 
law and the role of the judge. He was delighted to have read what 
seemed to Aquinas's affirmation of textualism: "Hence it is necessary 
to judge according to the written law, else judgment would fall short 
either of the natural or the positive right."82 But Scalia's happiness 
vanished in reading further: 
Just as the written law does not give force to the natural 
right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force, 
because neither can man's will change nature . . . 
Wherefore such documents are not be called, not laws, 
but rather corruptions of law . . . and consequently 
judgment should not be delivered according to them. 83 
"Horrors!" Scalia exclaimed. "A sentiment worthy of Chief 
80 Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: the Jurisprudence ofJustice Antonin 
Scalia, THE NEW YORKER (March 28, 2005), https://www.newyork 
er.com/magazine/2005/03/28/supreme-confidence. 
81 Antonin Scalia, Natural Law, in SCALIA SPEAKS, supra note 9, at 243. 
82 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMA THEOLOGlAE, Pt. 11-11, Art. 60, Q.5. And even 
better phrase for Scalia was St. Thomas 's quote of St. Augustine, "Jn these earthly 
laws, though men judge about them when they are making them, when once they are 
established and passed, the judges may judge no longer of them, but according to 
them. "Id. (emphasis in original). 
83 Id. 
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Justice Earl Warren!"84 But there was more. 
Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either 
always or for the most part, contrary to the natural 
right, so too laws that are rightly established, fail in 
some cases, when if they were observed they would be 
contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in such cases, 
judgment should be delivered, not according to the 
letter of the law, but according to equity which the 
lawgiver has in view. 85 
"Double horrors!" Scalia exclaimed again. "Judging not by text but by 
equity. A sentiment worthy of Justice William Brennan."86 
To counter Aquinas, Scalia gave examples of the deleterious 
effects a non-textual decision can wreak, one being the creation of a 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage. At bottom, Scalia averred, 
Aquinas had his vocation, and he had his. "He knows infinitely more 
about theology; but I have much more experience injudging."87 
What Scalia was trying to affirm was the self-discipline that is 
required of any vocation, be it mother, or artist, or truck driver, or 
teacher, or priest, or student, or theologian, or judge. Catholic 
spirituality calls it detachment, detachment from the temptation of 
things, even good things, which draw one away from one's vocation. 88 
It was that detachment-whether it be from public policy or the natural 
law-that Justice Scalia preached to his fellow justices. In sum, his 
message was: the politicians have their vocation. We have ours. Do 
not be what you were not called to be. 
And preach it he did. He was often an irascible scold to his 
peers. That's why his dissents are so enjoyable. That leads to a 
critique. One might say that Scalia's weakest virtue was prudence, 
84 ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 245. 
85 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 11-11, Art. 60, Q.5. 
86 ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 245. 
87 Id. 
88 "Detachment from creatures that are an obstacle to complete service of God 
is a normal condition for growth in holiness." Detachment, CATHOLIC DICTIONARY, 
https ://www. ca tho licculture. orgl culture/library Idictionary /index. cfm?id= 3 3 0 51 
(last visited March 29, 2019). 
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often called the "queen of the virtues,"89 which St. Thomas defined as 
"right reason applied to action."90 Sometimes, Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist preached back. "Nino," he wrote Scalia after yet another 
opinion criticizing Justice O'Connor's reasoning, "you are pissing off 
Sandra again. Stop it."91 
For Antonin Scalia, the Court was his temple, and the 
Constitution his magisterium. As Christ, in righteous anger, rid his 
"father's house," of the money changers,92 so Scalia felt called to rid 
the temple of those opinions failing to honor the Constitution as it was. 
"My most important function on the Supreme Court is to tell the 
majority to take a walk."93 He spoke often of the oath of office he 
took to defend the Constitution of the United States. In debate, 
opinion, interview, or plain conversation, for Antonin Scalia, 
originalism was a moral command, an unshakable necessity to his 
vocation as judge. The sovereign people had created the Constitution, 
"the substance of what continues to bind us together as a people,"94 
and he was without authority to subvert their will. 95 
But what of St. Thomas' s moral precept: no judge may render 
a decision contrary to the natural law? What if, despite the fallibility 
of one's reason, despite one's tendency to translate one subjective 
desires into moral imperatives, Justice Scalia was certain that a law 
was violative of the natural law? What if the two magisteria-the 
Constitution and the Church-were at odds? What should he do? In 
such a case, Scalia would bow to St. Thomas: he would not render a 
decision contrary to natural right. But only where "positive law places 
89 Don Fier, The Cardinal Virtues-Prudence, THE WANDERER PRESS (Sept. 
15, 2018), http ://thewandererpress.com/catholic/news/our-catholic-faith/the­
cardinal-virtues-prudence/. 
90 AQUINAS, supra note 85, at II-II, Q47, art. 2. 
91 RICHARD L. HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA 
AND THE POLITICS OF DISRUPTION 73 (2018). 
92 JOHN 2:14-15. 
93 JOAN BISKUPIC, supra note 11, at 283. 
94 ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 157. 
95 Article VI of the Constitution declares that "This Constitution ... shall be 
the Supreme Law of Land." One might emphasize that the words denote this 
Constitution, the 1787 one, not one which modem justices wished we would have. 
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a judge in the position ofbeing the instrument of evil."96 Here, Justice 
Scalia was calling upon a moral distinction undoubtedly schooled into 
him by his Jesuit teachers: one is morally culpable of an evil only if 
one formally or materially participates in its commission. 
One formally participates in an evil act if one actually does it 
with the requisite knowledge and intent: performing an abortion or 
executing a prisoner (if that is immoral), for example. One materially 
participates in an evil act if one knowingly provides the requisite 
means (which are normally not evil) for the act to be carried out by 
someone else. 97 This is where Scalia distinguished between the moral 
effect of his decisions on abortion and on capital punishment. 
In regard to abortion, all Scalia would hold is that the 
Constitution allows the states the right to forbid, restrict, or permit 
abortion. It is a jurisdictional issue. If a state decides to permit 
abortion, that is the state's moral failing (including its voters and the 
legislators), but not the judge who merely determines the jurisdictional 
question in accordance with the Constitution.98 Nor would lower court 
Catholic judges materially participate in an abortion in striking down 
a restrictive law under Roe v. Wade. "They merely hold ... that the 
government cannot prevent that killing."99 But capital punishment is 
different. 
When I sit on a Court that reviews and affirms capital 
convictions, I am part of 'the machinery of death.' My 
vote, when joined with at least four others, is, in most 
cases, the last step that permits an execution to proceed. 
I could not take part in that process if I believed what 
was being done to be immoral. 100 
The same would be true for lower court Catholic judges. There are 
not merely providing material co-operation, but "are themselves 
96 ANTONIN SCALIA SPEAKS, supra note 9, at 248. 
Gerry Rauch, Formal vs. Material, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REGISTER (Jan. 11, 
1998), http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/formal_ vs_material. 
98 The judge "[b]ears no moral guilt for the laws society has failed to enact." 
Scalia, supra note 59. 
99 ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 249. 
100 Scalia, supra note 59. 
97 
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decreeing death on behalf of the state."101 No morally acute Catholic 
could be a judge on a court that must decide whether a capital sentence 
is to be imposed or effectuated. 102 
Moreover, 
I do not think it would be a good thing if American 
Catholics running for legislative office had to oppose 
the death penalty (most of them would not be elected); 
if American Catholics running for Governor had to 
promise commutation of all death sentences (most of 
them would never reach the Governor's mansion); if 
American Catholics were ineligible to go on the bench 
in all jurisdictions imposing the death penalty; or if 
American Catholics were subject to recusal when 
called for jury duty in capital cases. 103 
This was the reason Scalia fought so vigorously against the 
new papal position on the death penalty. If a prohibition on capital 
punishment were truly part ofthe "deposit of faith," he could no longer 
be a servant of the Constitution and of God and still be a judge. 
On another issue, Scalia was acutely aware of the moral 
distinctions Catholic writers have made. Despite his sometimes 
haranguing dissents, Antonin Scalia did practice a deeper prudence. 
He often said, "I'm an originalist and a textualist, but I'm not a nut."104 
At other times he called himself a "faint-hearted originalist."105 He 
meant that particularly in relation to the incorporation doctrine, the 
long standing view that the 14th Amendment's due process clause 
somehow incorporates most of the Bill of Rights and applies them to 
101 Id 
102 Scalia understood that there was an exception for one who was materially 
co-operating in an evil, namely "[t]hat one can give 'material cooperation' to the 
immoral act of another when the evil that would attend failure to cooperate is even 
greater (for example, helping a burglar tie up a householder where the alternative is 
that the burglar would kill the householder)." But that exception does not apply to 
the trial or appellate judge, who is actually participating in the execution itself. Id 
103 Id 
104 Nina Totenberg, Justice Scalia, the Great Dissenter, Opens Up, NPR (April 
28, 2008), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=8998601 7. 
105 Originalism, supra note 2, at 863. 
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the States. Many have questioned whether incorporation was the 
original understanding of the drafters and ratifiers of the 14th 
Amendment. Scalia had his doubts. Now ifthe original understanding 
of the Constitution is a moral command, the central focus of one's 
vocation, how can one justify adhering to a series of precedents that 
one believes to be wrong? How Catholic is that? The answer is, very 
Catholic. The Church's moral philosophers have always counseled 
against creating scandal: scandal being defined as bringing into 
disorder a system that, despite its imperfections, is still fundamentally 
sound and upon which people depend. Here, Scalia chose to follow 
St. Thomas. Even though one has a right, as St. Thomas put it, to 
disobey unjust laws, one should "yield his right ... in order to avoid 
scandal or disturbance." 106 Scalia believed-contrary to the views of 
another originalist, Clarence Thomas-that disrupting the precedents 
on incorporation would cause such a scandal, so he accepted them. 
In sum, Antonin Scalia's notion of the role of a judge was 
informed by his Catholic understanding of vocation. But it was 
equally limited by his Catholic understanding of moral responsibility 
and of the dangers of scandal. 
IV 
During Antonin and Maureen Scalia's honeymoon year, they 
saw Robert Bolt's play, A Man for All Seasons, in London. 107 St. 
Thomas More, at least Bolt's depiction of him, became a model for 
Scalia, or a confirmation of Scalia's own understanding of how he 
should conduct his own life. More's distinction between the laws of 
God and the laws ofman struck Scalia as just right. More resigned his 
chancellorship because he could not affirm Henry VIII' s illegal 
divorce and displacement of the Pope as the head of the Church in 
England. But More was a reluctant martyr. He avoided sacrificing 
himself for a cause, until there was no other moral option. Through it 
all, More championed the positive law, "Man's laws, not God's." It 
was the rule of law that protects all, even the most evil of men (or 
106 AQUINAS, supra note 85, at 1-11, Q. 96, art. 4. 

107 Scalia, supra note 51, at 107. 
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spirits). Scalia's law was the Constitution, a noble document, but one 
which allowed men, and states, to make some kinds of bad law. Like 
More, Scalia would remain the "King's (the Constitution's) good 
servant" until there was no other option. And as More would resist 
the importuning of his son-in-law Roper, so Antonin Scalia would 
resist the importunings of causes, advocates, and justices (and popes), 
who thought they had the key to the "law" the supervened the 
Constitution. When it came, without escape, to a choice between 
man's law and God's, then More would choose God's law, as would 
Antonin Scalia, if it ever came to that. But Antonin Scalia fought to 
make sure that it never did. 
